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RECENT DECISIONS

(3) by a partner not to do anything to interfere, by competition or
otherwise, with the business of the firm; 9 (4) by the buyer of property not to use the same in competition with the business retained
by the seller; 10 and (5) by an agent, assistant, or servant not to
compete with his master or employer after the expiration of his time
of service 1 However, these categories will be upheld only when
they conform to the tests stated above. 12
The covenant now under discussion is to be tested, then, on the
basis of whether or not it is only such as is necessary to afford a
fair protection to the interest of the party in whose favor it is given,
13
and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public.
The manifest purpose of the lease under discussion is to transfer
possession to the tenant and rent to the lessor. Was this purpose
protected by the covenant which was to restrain the defendant from
competing with the Newark Company? The proposition is selfexplanatory. The intended beneficiary was not the lessor, but the
co-plaintiff who had no such interest in the contract as would merit
the exaction of this restrictive clause-no pertinent interest, property
or otherwise, which demanded safeguarding.
J. J. F.

CRIMINAL LAW-ABORTION-WOMAN NOT PREGNANT IN LAW
UNTIL CHILD HAS QUICKENED. - The defendant was convicted

under a North Carolina statute' which makes it unlawful for any
person to administer drugs to a woman "either pregnant or quick
with child... with intent thereby to destroy such child." The complainant's testimony indicated that she was made pregnant by the
defendant on June 14, 1948; and that the defendant, when informed
of the pregnancy, purchased medicine and took her to a doctor for
injections in order to destroy her unborn child. She also testified
that she did not feel the movement of the child within her body until
after August 25, the date of the indictment. The defendant based
his appeal on the fact that the complainant was not quick with child,
and therefore had not advanced to the required stage of pregnancy,
within the meaning of the statute, at the time of his allegedly criminal acts. Held, judgment reversed. If pregnancy has not advanced
sufficiently so that there is a living child, that is, a quick child, then
9Matthews v. Associated Press, 136 N. Y. 333, 32 N. E. 981 (1893).
Hodge v. Sloan, supra note 2; Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N. Y. 241 (1851).
12 Herreshoff v. Bontineau, 17 R. I. 3, 19 Ati. 712 (1890).
12
' United States v. Addyston Pipe and Supply Co.. supra note 4.
13 Fowle v. Parke, supra note 7; Gibbs v. Gas Company, 130 U. S. 393
(1889) ; Taylor Iron Co. v. Nichols, 73 N. J. Eq. 684, 69 AtL. 186 (1908).
1N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-44 (1943).
20
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the felonious destruction of the fetus would not constitute a destruction of th child within the meaning of the abortion statute. State
v. Green, - N. C. -, 53 S. E. 2d 285 (1949).
The foetal child is not a subject upon which all crimes can be
committed; the criminal law completely protecting only the living
human being. Under ancient common law, ".... if a woman be quick
with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it in her womb, or
if a man beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is
delivered of a dead child, this is a great misprison and no murder." 2
Under decisional law today the courts are divided on the question
whether the woman, whom the accused causes to miscarry, must be
quick with child in order to render the miscarriage criminal. A number of states have observed that there was no criminal liability in
aborting a child not yet quickened. 3 In the instant case the court
similarly noted that, ". . . the child with which the woman is pregnant must be so far advanced as to be regarded in law as having a
separate existence, a life capable of being destroyed." 4 In Pennsylvania, however, when deciding Mills v. Commonwealth,5 the court
came to the conclusion that, "It is not the murder of the living child
which constitutes the offense, but the destruction of gestation, by
wicked means and against nature. The moment the womb is instinct with embryo life, and gestation has begun, the crime may be
perpetrated." 6
New York 7 and some other jurisdictions 8 are not troubled with
this problem, for as long as the unlawful intent to procure an abortion is present, it is not required that the woman be pregnant at all.
A. B.

2 3 Co. INsT. 50 as quoted in Commonwealth v. Parker, 9 Metc. 263, 266
(Mass. 1845).
3Hunter v. State, 29 Ga. App. 366, 115 S. E. 277 (1923); People v.
McDowell, 63 Mich. 229, 30 N. W. 68 (1886) ; State v. Forte, 222 N. C. 537,
23 S.E. 2d 842 (1943).
4 State v. Forte, supra note 3 at -, 23 S. E. 2d at 843.
513
Pa. 626 (1850).
6
Id. at 632.
7 People v. Axelsen, 223 N. Y. 650, 119 N. E. 708 (1918).
Here the de-

fendant was convicted of the crime of attempt to commit abortion, the indictment and the proof affirmatively showing that the subject was not a pregnant
woman. The conviction was affirmed on the ground that pregnancy is not a
material element of the crime of abortion under N. Y. PENAL LAW § 80(2).
8 Rinker v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 59 Cal. App. 2d 222,

138 P. 2d 403 (1943); Eggart v. State, 40 Fla. 527, 25 So. 144 (1898);
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 132 Mass. 261 (1882); State v. Montifoire, 95 Vt.
508, 116 AtI. 77 (1922) ; State v. Russell, 90 Wash. 474, 156 Pac. 565 (1916).

